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Abstract. Multivariate public key cryptography (MPKC) is one of the
main candidates for post-quantum cryptography. Rainbow, an improved
(multi-layer) version of Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar (UOV), is one of
the most famous multivariate signature schemes that is a promising candidate for NIST standardization. At INDOCRYPT 2017, Beullens and
Preneel [2] introduced a new variant LUOV of UOV. Their idea is to
generate a UOV scheme over the binary field L = F2 and then lift it
into a bigger field K = F2r and hence dramatically reduces the public
key size. In this paper, we first theoretically deduce the choice for the
subfield L (which is different from F2 ) which results in smaller signature
sizes (up to 40%). Moreover, we extend the idea to Rainbow and theoretically yield the optimal choice for the subfield L over which a Rainbow is
generated before being lifted to K. As a result, we can deduce the public
key size of the obtained Rainbow scheme up to 37.5%.

1

Introduction

Post-quantum cryptography is a new direction in the last two decades after
the thread of polynomial quantum algorithms of Shor [23] which totally break
currently most widely used public key cryptosystems RSA [22], DSA [13] and
ECC [12]. It takes much more attention recently after the call of NIST [15]
for proposals of post-quantum cryptosystems to be standardized in near future.
There have been a number of submissions for the first round [16] and the first
NIST conference has been recently held for discussions [17].
Multivariate cryptography is one of the main candidates for this standardization [15,16]. Multivariate schemes are in general very fast and require only
modest computational resources, which can be used on low cost devices like
smart cards and RFID chips [4,5]. Multivariate schemes were first proposed by
Matsumoto and Imai in the mid 1980s [14]. Since then there have been a rich
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development of designing multivariate schemes into several directions, e.g. BigField or SingleField schemes. The first SingleField signature scheme was the Oil
and Vinegar (OV) signature scheme, introduced by Patarin after he broke the
Matsumoto-Imai scheme [18]. Soon after, Patarin broke the OV schemes and
introduced a variant [11], which is called Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar (UOV)
scheme. After around two decades, UOV schemes are still secure up to choices of
parameters. While the signature generation of UOV is very efficient, it has a very
large public key. To deal with this, several improvements have been suggested.
The first improvement was made by Ding and Schmidt [7], who proposed the
Rainbow signature scheme, which can be seen as a multi-layer version of UOV
with smaller keys and shorter signatures. The Rainbow signature scheme is still
secure for around Other important improvements were made by Petzoldt [19] to
dramatically reduce the public key sizes of UOV schemes.
At Indocrypt 2017, Beullens and Preneel [2] proposed a new variant of UOV,
called LUOV. Their idea is to first generate a UOV scheme over the binary
field F2 , and then lift into the bigger field F2r to get a UOV scheme over F2r .
Associated to Petzoldt’s methods [19], their schemes have small public key sizes
and are efficient in verification4 . However, for security reason, LUOV is a large
system of large number of variables, which result in large signature sizes and
blow up the ratio between the vinegar and oil variables.
In this paper we revisit the LUOV scheme [2] and theoretically derive the
choice of subfields L = F2t over which the UOV is first generated before being
lifted to the big field F2r . As a result, we can reduce the number of variables and
equations which imply to deduce up to 40% of the signature sizes, compared to
those of LUOV. As a trade-off, since using non-binary field L, the public key
sizes of our schemes increase around 30% to those of LUOV5 .
In addition, we extend the idea of field lifting to Rainbow signature schemes.
We use our method to theoretically deduce the choice of the subfield L and
construct the new LRainbow scheme based on the aforementioned technique for
LUOV. As a result, we can reduce the public key size up to 37.5%.

2

Preliminaries

In this section, we recall some basic concepts of multivariate public key cryptography. The basic objects of multivariate cryptography are systems of multivariate
quadratic polynomials over a finite field K. The security of multivariate schemes
is based on the MQ-Problem which asks for a solution of a given system of multivariate quadratic polynomials over the field K. The MQ-Problem is proven to
be NP-hard even for quadratic polynomials over the field F2 [10].
To build a multivariate public key cryptosystem, one starts with an easily
invertible quadratic map F : K n → K m (central map). To hide the structure
4

5

LUOV has been submitted to NIST [17] with some optimizations. In this paper, we
just compare our work with the original LUOV.
for 120, 196 and 256 bit security, but it is approximately the same in 100 bit security;
see Table 3 for details.
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of F in the public key, one composes it with two invertible affine (or linear)
maps T : K m → K m and S : K n → K n . The public key is therefore given by
P = T ◦ F ◦ S : K n → K m . The private key consists of T , F and S.
In this paper we consider multivariate signature schemes. For these schemes,
we require n ≥ m, which ensures that every message has a signature.
Signature Generation: To generate a signature for a message (or its hash value)
d ∈ K m , one computes recursively w = T −1 (d) ∈ K m , y = F −1 (w) ∈ K n and
z = S −1 (y). z ∈ K n is the signature of the message d. Here, F −1 (w) means
finding one (of possibly many) pre-image of w under the central map F.
Signature Verification: To check the authenticity of a signature z ∈ K n , the
verifier simply computes d0 = P(z). If the result is equal to the message d, the
signature is accepted, otherwise rejected.

Signature Generation
d ∈ Kqm

−1

T w ∈ Kqm

F −1
-

y ∈ Kqn

S −1
-

z ∈ Kqn

6
P
Verification

Fig. 1. Two processes of multivariate signature schemes

3

Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar signature scheme

In this section, we first recall the construction of Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar
(UOV) signature scheme in Section 3.1 and a method of Petzoldt [19] to reduce
the public key of UOV in Section 3.2. Lastly, the LUOV scheme by Beullens and
Preneel [2] is described in Section 3.3
3.1

UOV Signature Schemes

Let K = Fq be the finite field with q elements and let n = v + o with v, o positive
integers. An oil-vinegar quadratic polynomial over K is of the form
X
1≤i≤n
1≤j≤v

aij xi xj +

n
X
i=1

bi xi + c,

4
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with coefficients aij , bi , c ∈ K. The variables x1 , . . . , xv are called vinegar variables, and xv+1 , . . . , xn the oil variables. Note that in an oil-vinegar polynomial,
the oil and vinegar variables are not fully mixed, i.e., there are no quadratic
terms x2 for oil variables x. A UOV scheme is constructed as the following.
The central map F : K n → K o , (x1 , . . . , xn ) 7→ (f (1) , . . . , f (o) ) consists of o
oil-vinegar polynomials
X

f (1) =

(1)

aij xi xj +

n
X

(1)

bi xi + c(1) ,

i=1

1≤i≤n
1≤j≤v

·········
n
X (o)
X
(o)
aij xi xj +
f (o) =
bi xi + c(o1 ) ,
i=1

1≤i≤n
1≤j≤v
(k)

(k)

where the coefficients aij , bij , c(k) are in K. Choose randomly two invertible
affine maps S : K n → K n and T : K o → K o . The public key is given by
P = T ◦ F ◦ S : K n → K o , and the private key consists of T , F and S.
To sign a message m = (m1 , . . . , mo ) ∈ K o , we first compute y = T −1 (m) =
(y1 , . . . , yo ) and do the following.
(1) Randomly choose vinegar values a = (a1 , . . . , av ) ∈ K v and plug into the
polynomials in the central map to obtain f¯(1) , . . . , f¯(o) .
(2) Solving the linear system f¯(i) = yi with i = 1, . . . , o yields solution (b1 , . . . , bo ).
If there is no solution then come back to Step (1).
(3) Set x = (a1 , . . . , av , b1 , . . . , bo ). A signature is computed by s := S −1 (x).
A signature s is accepted if P(s) = m, otherwise it is rejected.
The public key of the scheme consists of o quadratic equations in n variables,
and hence the public key has size
o·

(n + 1)(n + 2)
2

field elements

and the size of the private key is

o · (o + 1) + n(n + 1) + o ·

v(v + 1)
+v·o+n+1
2



field elements.
3.2

Reducing public key size of UOV

Petzoldt [19] proposed a method to reduce the public key size of UOV with the
main idea as follows.
Set
v(v + 1)
+ ov
D=
2
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be the number of quadratic terms of each oil-vinegar polynomial in the central
map. One should arrange the public polynomials in lexicographic order and set
up the corresponding matrix consisting of the coefficients. Let B be its o × D
sub-matrix consisting of the coefficients of the quadratic terms on the public
polynomials. Then Petzoldt choose the B to be circular, i.e., choose the first
row randomly and other rows are just rotations of the first one. Other entries
are randomly chosen. Using the structure of UOV, the chosen public key can
be used to generate the corresponding private key. One important point is that
generating such the public key has not found any risk to the security of the
scheme. By that method, the CyclicUOV scheme now has public key size


o(o + 1)
+n+1
field elements.
D+o·
2
One can associate with the cyclic structure of UOV a Pseudo-Random-Number
Generator (PRNG) or a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) for generating
and storing the matrix B to reduce the public key significantly [19], as used in
Beullens and Preneel [2]. In this paper, we just apply only the cyclic method
and compute the corresponding public key size by above formula.
3.3

LUOV Signature Scheme

At INDOCRYPT 2017, Beullens and Preneel [2] introduced another method to
reduce the public key size of UOV. Their idea is to first generate the UOV scheme
over F2 , i.e., the secret key F, S, T (and hence the public key P) are chosen to
be over F2 . The keys are then lifted to the bigger field F2r to obtain a UOV
scheme over F2r . The public key of LUOV scheme now is
o·

(n + 1)(n + 2)
2

bits.

One then can apply a method of Petzoldt [19] mentioned in Section 3.2 to reduce
the public key to


v(v + 1)
o(o + 1)
+o·v+o·
+n+1
bits.
2
2
A signature consists of n elements of F2r , hence it has size nr bits.

4

Choosing subfields for LUOV

In this section, we first revisit known attacks against UOV and from that derive
the parameter choices for LUOV. To be precise, in order to generate LUOV over
F2r , we give a choice for a subfield F2t over which a UOV scheme is generated
before being lifted to obtain a UOV scheme over F2r . In LUOV, the authors
chose t = 1, i.e., first generate a UOV scheme over F2 . In Section 4.2, we show
that our choice t = 2 yields a scheme with a slightly larger public key but much
smaller signature size (around 40% reduced).

6
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Security Analysis

In this section, we look at currently known attacks against UOV.
Direct Attacks The direct attack is the most straightforward attack to forge
a signature by simply solving the equation P(x) = d given the message d.
One then can use a solver such as Gröbner basis techniques F4 [9] and F5 [1].
Since UOV is a underdetermined system, the most efficient technique to solve
P(x) = d is the Hybrid method F5 which fixes k variables and solve the system
of m equations with n − k variables. The complexity can be estimated as


ω
n − k + dreg − 1
k
min q · O m ·
,
k≥0
dreg
where 2 < ω ≤ 3 is the linear algebra constant of solving a linear system and
dreg is the degree of regularity of the system.
It has been well known that general UOV schemes under direct attacks behave similar to random systems. It holds also for LUOV with L = F2 , as in
experiments in [2]. In such case, we can estimate the degree of regularity of
LUOV to be the smallest d for which the coefficient of xd in the expression
(1 − x2 )m
(1 − x)m−k
is non-positive.
UOV Attack The UOV attack tries to find an equivalent key to forge a signature. This was introduced by Paratin to break Balanced Oil and Vinegar
scheme [11]. The attack can be generalized to the unbalanced case. The goal of
this attack is to find the pre-image of the so called Oil subspace O under the
affine transformation S where O = {x ∈ K | x1 = x2 = · · · = xv = 0}. Finding
this space allows us to separate the oil from the vinegar variables and recover
the private key. The complexity of this attack is estimated as
q v−o−1 · o4 .
4.2

Choosing subfields

We now consider the field K = F2r and would like to choose a subfield L = F2t
with t < r over which we generate a UOV scheme. We follow [2] to choose
the fields K to be F232 , F248 , F264 and F280 . In order to be secure against the
direct attack, the public key should contain at least 27, 34, 50 and 66 polynomials respectively for security level of 100 bits, 128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits
respectively. For a l bits security level, we require
2t(v−o−1) · o4 > 2l
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which is equivalent to
t(v − o − 1) + 4 log(o) > l.

(1)

Since we generate UOV schemes over a subfield, it must be that v > 2o, compared
to v = 2o in usual UOV schemes. For the purpose of reducing the signature size,
optimally choose v ∼
= 2.5·o. Plugging each pair (o, l) = (27, 100), (34, 128), (50, 192)
and (66, 256) into Equation (1), one obtains that t = 2 for all cases. This yields
our variant for LUOV, which we call LUOV2.
We do experiments for LUOV2 against direct attack, and the results are
recorded in Table 1. The Table 1 shows that our LUOV2 scheme behaves similar
to the corresponding random system. Hence, we can use the analysis in Section 4.1 for evaluating the degree of regularity of our LUOV2 scheme and hence
estimating the complexity of direct attack against LUOV2.
Table 1. Comparison of degree of regularity of LUOV2 and random system with several
parameters over F232
(v,o)
(13,5) (15,6) (18, 7) (20,8) (23,9) (25,10)
LUOV2
7
8
9
10
11
12
Random System 7
8
9
10
11
12

4.3

Parameters and Implementation

Table 3 shows our choice of parameters and comparison with LUOV [2] schemes.
Here, each scheme is a UOV generated over L = F2t and then lifted into K = F2r .
The main difference of our scheme LUOV2 with LUOV scheme is that we choose
L = F22 instead of F2 in [2]. As can be seen from Table 3, with our choice of
L = F22 , the public key size is almost similar to that of LUOV for 100-bit
security, and approximately 30% larger for other security levels. However, our
numbers of oil and vinegar variables are reduced, which decrease the signature
sizes 40% compared to those of LUOV.
Table 2. Parametersand keysizes of LUOV [2] and LUOV2
Sec. Level
100 bits
128 bits
192 bits
256 bits

Scheme(r, t, o, v)
Public Key (kB) Signature (kB)
LUOV(32, 1, 31, 134)
4.21
0.6
LUOV2(32, 2, 27, 69)
4.27
0.36
LUOV(48, 1, 38, 171)
7.16
1.2
LUOV2(48, 2, 36, 91)
9.0
0.76
LUOV(64, 1, 54, 256)
17.96
2.4
LUOV2(64, 2, 50, 136)
22.3
1.49
LUOV(80, 1, 70, 341)
35.62
4.0
LUOV2(80, 2, 66, 183)
47.8
2.49
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LRainbow: Field Lifting for Rainbow

In this Section, we extend the idea of Beullens and Preneel [2] and Section 4 for
Rainbow scheme [7]. We first recall the construction of Rainbow in Section 5.1,
Petzoldt’s method for reducing the public key size in Section 5.2 and attacks in
Section 5.3. Then we introduce the field lifting version LRainbow of Rainbow
(cf. Section 5.4) and the choice of subfield together with parameters and key
sizes in Section 5.5.
5.1

Rainbow Signature Scheme

Rainbow signature schemes are multi-layer versions of UOV schemes. For convenience we introduce two layered Rainbow scheme (in design, there is no advantage of using more than two layers). Let K = Fq be the finite field with q elements
n = v + o1 + o2 with v, o1 , o2 positive integers. Set m = o1 + o2 , v2 = o1 + v1 .
The Rainbow central map F : K n → K o1 +o2 , (x1 , . . . , xn ) 7→ (f1 , . . . , fo1 +o2 )
consists of m = o1 + o2 following polynomials
f

(1)

(1)
aij xi xj

X

=

+

vX
1 +o1

(1)

bi xi + c(1) ,

i=1

1≤i≤v1 +o1
1≤j≤v1

·········
(o )

X

f (o1 ) =

aij 1 xi xj +

(o +1)

X

(o1 )

bi

xi + c(o1 ) ,

i=1

1≤i≤v1 +o1
1≤j≤v1

f (o1 +1) =

vX
1 +o1

aij 1

xi xj +

n
X

(o1 +1)

bi

xi + c(o1 +1) ,

i=1

1≤i≤n
1≤j≤v1 +o1

·········
f (o1 +o2 ) =

(o +o2 )

X

aij 1

1≤i≤n
1≤j≤v1 +o1

(k)

xi xj +

n
X

(o1 +o2 )

bi

xi + c(o1 +o2 ) ,

i=1

(k)

where the coefficients aij , bij , c(k) are in K. Choose randomly two invertible
affine maps S : K n → K n and T : K o1 +o2 → K o1 +o2 . The public key is given
by P = T ◦ F ◦ S : K n → K o1 +o2 , and the private key consists of T , F and S.
To sign a message m = (m1 , . . . , mo1 +o2 ) ∈ K o1 +o2 , we first compute y =
−1
T (m) = (y1 , . . . , yo1 +o2 ) and do the following.
(1) Choose a = (a1 , . . . , av1 ) ∈ K v1 and plug into the polynomials in the central
map to obtain f¯(1) , . . . , f¯(o1 +o2 ) .
(2) Solving the linear system f¯(i) = yi with i = 1, . . . , o1 yields solution (b1 , . . . , bo1 ).
If there is no solution then come back to Step (1).
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(3) Plug (b1 , . . . , bo1 ) into f¯(o1 +1) , . . . , f¯(o1 +o2 ) and solve the linear system f¯(i) =
yi with i = o1 + 1, . . . , o1 + o2 to get a solution (bo1 +1 , . . . , bo1 +o2 ). If there
is no solution then come back to Step (1).
(4) Set x = (a1 , . . . , av1 , b1 , . . . , bo1 +o2 ). A signature is computed by s := S −1 (x).
A signature s is accepted if P(s) = m, otherwise it is rejected.
The public key of the scheme consists of m quadratic equations in n variables,
and hence the public key has size
m·

(n + 1)(n + 2)
2

field elements

and the size of the private key is
m · (n + 1) + n(n + 1) +

2
X


oi

i=1

vi (vi + 1)
+ vi · oi + vi+1 + 1
2



field elements.
5.2

CyclicRainbow

Petzoldt [20] proposed a way to reduce the public key size of Rainbow as follows.
For i = 1, 2, set
vi (vi + 1)
+ oi vi
Di =
2
to be the number of quadratic terms in the i-th layer of the Rainbow scheme.
Assume that the matrix representing the public key is of the form:

D2

z

}|

{

C
B1
B2
|

{z

D1

}

Fig. 2. Structure of the public key P

Then Petzoldt choose the matrices B1 and B2 to be circular, i.e., choose the
first row randomly and other rows are just rotations of the first one. Other entries
are randomly chosen. Using the structure of Rainbow, the chosen public key can
be used to generate the corresponding private key. One important point is that
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making the public key has not found any risk to the security of the scheme. By
that method, the CyclicRainbow scheme now has public key size
D2 +

2
X
i=1


oi

(n + 1)(n + 2)
− Di
2


=

2

D2 + m ·

(n + 1)(n + 2) X
−
oi · Di
2
i=1

field elements.
5.3

Attacks

In this section, we review all currently known (classical) attacks against Rainbow.
Direct Attacks It is also well-known that Rainbow schemes behave similarly
to random systems and therefore we can estimate the complexity of direct attack
against Rainbow as in the case of UOV (cf. Section 5.3. The complexity can be
estimated as


ω
n − k + dreg − 1
k
min q · O m ·
,
k≥0
dreg
where 2 < ω ≤ 3 is the linear algebra constant of solving a linear system and dreg
is the degree of regularity of the system, which can be estimated as the smallest
d for which the coefficient of xd in the expression
(1 − x2 )m
.
(1 − x)m−k
is non-positive.
The Rank Attacks There are Minrank [3] and Highrank [6] attacks. The Minrank [3] attack tries to find a linear combination of the public key polynomials
of minimal rank. In case of Rainbow, such minimal rank is v2 which corresponds
to a linear combination of polynomials in the first layer of the central map. The
complexity is estimated as
 3

m2
n
v1 +1
−
.
(2)
q
·m·
3
6
The Highrank [6] attack tries to identify variables that appear the lowest number
of times in the polynomials of the central map. In case of Rainbow, those are the
oil variables of the last layer. The complexity of the Highrank attack is estimated
as
n3
q o2 ·
.
(3)
6

Choosing Subfields for LUOV and Field Lifting for Rainbow

11

UOV Attack One can consider Rainbow as a UOV scheme with v = v1 + o1
and o = o2 and hence it can be attacked by the UOV attack. Its goal is to find
the pre-image of the Oil subspace {x ∈ K n : x1 = · · · = xv = 0} under the affine
transformation S. The complexity of this attack is estimated as
q n−2o2 −1 · o42 .

(4)

Rainbow-Band-Separation Attack The Rainbow-Band-Separation (RBS)
attack [8] tries to find linear transformations S and T that transform the public
polynomials into ones of the form of polynomials in the central map of Rainbow,
and hence find an equivalent key to forge a signature. To do this, one has to
solve m + n − 1 equations in n variables. In our paper, we use the field K = F28
and we follow [21] to choose n ≥ 35 (m − 1) so that the complexity of the RBS
attack against Rainbow is at least the complexity of the direct attack.
5.4

Lifting Rainbow to Extension Fields

In this section, we extend the idea of LUOV to Rainbow, i.e., we will work with Rainbow over the field K = F2r .
The idea is to generate the Rainbow a key pair over a subfield L = F t (with 1 ≤ t ≤ r), i.e., all coefficients of
2
F , S, T and hence P = T ◦ F ◦ S are over L. Then we lift them up to F2r and consider the new scheme as a Rainbow
scheme over K = F2r . We follow .. to call this scheme LRainbow. As mentioned in, the choice of r is very important:
if r is large than we can reduce the number of public equations; however for efficiency, r can not be too large. One
must be care full in choosing parameters to balance the trade-off between whether r is large or small.
The public key of the LRainbow scheme now is

m·

(n + 1)(n + 2)

·t

bits.

2
A signature consists of n elements of F2r , hence it has size nr bits.

5.5

Choice of subfield and parameters

We choose K = F28 to be the field with 256 elements. We follow [21] for choosing
parameters. Let l be the desired security level, then the number of equations of
the Rainbow scheme should be at least
m(l) = d

l − 12.1
e,
2.65

(5)

and the number of oil variables o2 in the second layer is at least
o2 (l) = d

l − 3 · log(m) + log(6)
e.
8

(6)

As mentioned in Section 5.3, the number of variables n(l) should be at least
n(l) ≥

5
(m(l) − 1)
3

(7)

so that the complexity of the RBS attack against Rainbow scheme is at least the
complexity of the direct attack.
Since we choose K = F28 , and our target security levels are l = 100, 128, 196
and 256, it follows from (5) that the minimum number of public equations mmin

12
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Table 3. Parameters and key sizes of LRainbow scheme
Security level
100
128
192
256

(v1 , o1 , o2 ) Public key size (kB) Signature size (B)
(23, 16, 18)
13.84
57
(28, 21, 23)
28.21
72
(44, 32, 36)
99.53
112
(61, 46, 48)
257.63
155

is at least 34, 44, 68 and 94 respectively. We choose o2 ∼
= o1 (with o2 is a bit
slightly larger than o1 , and since we would like to also reduce the signature
length, v1 can not be too large. In order to be consistent with (7), we optimally
choose v1 ≤ 1.3 · o2 . Plugging each mmin = 34, 44, 68, 94 into (2),(3), and (4)
and requires that they are larger than 2100 , 2128 , 2192 and 2256 respectively, we
optimally obtain log(q) = 5.
So our LRainbow is constructed by first generating a CyclicRainbow (cf.
Section 5.2) scheme over L = F25 and lifting it into K = F28 to obtain a Rainbow
scheme over K. Table 3 shows our choice of parameters for target security level
together with public key and signature size. By our choice of subfield L, the
public key size of LRainbow is reduced 37.5% compared to that of corresponding
CyclicRainbow over K.
Remark 1. One can choose L = F2 as in the case of LUOV. However, in order
to avoid attacks, one need to choose large numbers of oil and vinegar variables,
which will result in large key and signature sizes.

6

Conclusion

In this paper, we revisit the construction of LUOV scheme [2] and theoretically
deduce the choice of subfield over which the UOV scheme first generated before
being lifted to the full field. As a result, our method can reduce the signature
size up to 40%. Moreover, we also extend this idea to Rainbow signature scheme
obtain a field lifting Rainbow scheme, called LRainbow. As a result, our LRainbow scheme can reduce up to 37.5% the public key size. One can again reduce
the public key size by using the method in [24] with the cost of increasing the
signature size, which will be addressed in our future work.
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